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A Critical Examination of the Targeted Export
Assistance Program, Its Transformation into the
Market Promotion Program and Its Future
David R. Purnell, B.A., J.D., LL.M. t
I. Introduction
Agricultural commodities have long played a major role in the
export markets of the United States. Despite serious declines in vol-
ume and value in the early 1980s, agricultural products continue to
make up a very substantial block of exports. The expansion of ex-
port markets for agriculture seems to be the aspiration of many in
the agricultural sector and in Congress as both seek solutions to
tough problems such as a negative balance of trade, a huge federal
budget deficit, severe financial distress, and dislocation in the agri-
cultural sector. In addition to the longstanding programs, several
federal programs have been developed in recent years to assist and
to encourage the export of U.S. agricultural commodities and
products.
A principal focus of this article is one such program-the
Targeted Export Assistance program (TEA program). Authorized in
the Food Security Act of 1985 (1985 Farm Bill), the TEA program
offered federally funded financial assistance in the short-term devel-
opment of export markets for U.S. agricultural commodities, espe-
cially High Value Products (HVPs).I Conceived as a partial response
to aggressive and allegedly unfair trade practices of some competi-
tors, the TEA program generated controversy regarding its effective-
ness and desirability. There were also charges of serious difficulties
in its administration and implementation. The General Accounting
Office (GAO) twice reported to Congress on problems in the admin-
istration of the TEA program, the Office of Inspector General (OIG)
of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) conducted at least
t Brigham Young University, B.A., 1980; Brigham Young University, J.D., 1983;
University of Arkansas, LL.M., 1991.
I High Value Products are those agricultural commodities, which because of some
unique or particular characteristic, are valued and priced above the standard for the com-
modities sold as standard bulk commodities. HVPs include value added products that are
commodities processed or refined in some way changing the nature of the commodity and
differentiating it from the raw commodity from which it was derived.
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two substantial audits of the program, and participants experienced
significant delays in receiving benefits.
In the Food, Agriculture, Commerce and Trade Act of 1990 (the
1990 Farm Bill) the TEA program was repealed2 and replaced by the
Market Promotion Program (MPP)3 . However, the basic nature of
the TEA program was carried forward in the MPP. Many of the TEA
program regulations were codified intact and others were codified
with some modification. Although significant changes were made
addressing some of the main concerns raised by the GAO and OIG,
not all of their recommendations were implemented.
This Article explores the nature, formation, and evolution of the
TEA and MPP programs as well as their role in the larger U.S. agri-
cultural trade policy and legislative framework. These programs are
further examined within the context of the international legal frame-
work, in particular, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT). Finally, some options for the future elimination, continua-
tion or transformation of the MPP will be examined.
II. The U.S. Policy and Program Framework for the Targeted Export
Assistance Program
As one of the world's most abundant food and feed 4 producing
countries, the United States can legitimately lay claim to a particu-
larly strong interest in international agricultural trade. This interest
influences not only the formulation and implementation of U.S. agri-
cultural export policy, but of domestic agricultural policy as well.
The U.S. government is involved extensively in the agricultural
sector. Through intervention, the government hopes to achieve pol-
icy objectives such as income stabilization for the farm sector, market
stabilization for both the farm and consumer sectors, and price stabi-
lization for consumers. The policy tools of government intervention
include disaster relief payments, production limitations of various
types, resource conservation, and excess supply management
through storage, food aid, and export promotion. A variety of fed-
eral farm programs have been drafted, authorized and implemented
over the years, particularly since the Great Depression and the devel-
opment of more intervention-oriented policies of the New Deal.
Some programs are still in effect, others have become inactive, while
others have never been implemented. 5
2 Food Security Act of 1985, § 1124, 7 U.S.C. 1736s (1988) repealed by Food, Agricul-
ture, Commerce and Trade Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-624, Title XV, § 1572(3), 104
Stat. 3702 (1990).
3 7 U.S.C.A. § 5623 (West Supp. 1993).
4 Feed is consumed by livestock, as distinguished from food which is consumed by
people.
5 Since the 1930s, Congress has enacted an amazing volume of commodity
legislation. From first to last, there has been a strong sense in the language
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In recent years, there has been an increased policy emphasis on
export promotion. In order to encourage and to enhance export op-
portunities for domestic business, the U.S. government has created,
revived and implemented a number of export enhancement and
assistance programs. Some of the programs are unique to agricul-
ture, while others are available to a cross-section of business inter-
ests.. The convoluted history and piecemeal implementation of
agricultural policy and programs resulted in a remarkably complex
structural and policy framework to which the TEA program was
added. 6 A brief review of the major trade programs affecting agricul-
ture should help provide a better understanding of the TEA
program.
A. The Foreign Market Development Program
1. Origin of the Cooperator Program
The Foreign Market Development Program (the Cooperator
program) was the conceptual precursor of the Targeted Export
Assistance program. Accordingly, an understanding of the Coopera-
tor program is essential to an understanding of the TEA program.
As is the case with so many agricultural programs, the early history
of the Cooperator program is convoluted. Its roots go back to Public
Law 480, commonly known both as the Food for Peace program and
as P.L. 480. P.L. 480 was created in the Agricultural Trade Develop-
ment and Assistance Act of 1954. It drew together, under one um-
brella, several pre-existing programs and added several more
programs and functions.
The Cooperator program was one of the new programs created
under the P.L. 480 umbrella. It was conceived as a program to main-
of the bills, in the hearings held, and in Congressional committee reports
that the programs legislated are to be regarded as experimental. They often
have been set up to last only a few years. There is some "permanent" legisla-
tion, however, from the 1930s and 1940s, and many later laws are expressed
as amendments to it. Thus, our commodity legislation as of 1980 is a
hodgepodge of pieces of laws dating from the 1930s to the present, with
many provisions lying inactive or never clearly spelled out in practical terms
of programs. In consequence, one could read the entire substantial compila-
tion of farm-commodity legislation in law today and at the end have only the
foggiest notion of what is actually being done in farm policy.
B. L. GARDNER, THE GOVERNING OF AGRICULTURE 17 (1981).
6 Two features of the institutional framework for federal farm commodity
policy make economic[*] analysis difficult: (1) the legislation in the area is
extremely complex; and (2) wide and often imprecisely defined discretionary
authority is given to the executive branch.
The complexity of legislation arises not so much from any particular law
but from the way in which many laws fit together .... The legal basis for
policy ... is contained in separate laws, written at different times, which have
widely varying policy instruments and executive authorities.
Id. Even more confusing is the process by which these laws change over time. Id.
*For the word "economic" in this quotation, I suggest the word "legal" would be equally
appropriate. The difficulties engendered by the factors outlined in this description are at
least as challenging for legal analysis as for economic analysis.
19931
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tain, to expand, and to develop long-term foreign markets for sur-
plus U.S agricultural commodities. 7 Foreign currency revenues
generated under Title I of P.L. 4808 were authorized to be used for
foreign market development. 9 Because the Cooperator program was
oriented to the development of markets for surplus commodities, ba-
sic commodities such as wheat, cotton and soybeans were the pri-
mary commodities promoted.' 0 The legislation authorizing the
Cooperator program remains in force and Congress continues to ap-
propriate funds for its operation.
2. Operation of the Cooperator Program
The Cooperator program is administered by the Foreign Agri-
cultural Service (FAS) which is a part of the United States Depart-
ment of Agriculture (USDA). The FAS may enter into a
"Cooperative Program Agreement" with "Cooperators" who agree
to undertake development of foreign markets for surplus U.S. agri-
cultural commodities. " From the inception of the Cooperator pro-
gram, the idea was to involve the private sector, much as its name
suggests. Cooperators are typically non-profit agricultural commod-
ity organizations whose membership includes farmers, processors,
and traders.' 2 The FAS contributes foreign currencies derived from
sales under Title I of the Food for Peace program, and the Coopera-
tor "contributes or causes to be contributed dollars, foreign currencies,
property, services, or combinations thereof" toward the cooperative
foreign market development efforts.' 3 The fact that the Cooperator
has the flexibility to cause to be contributed dollars, foreign currencies,
property, services, or combinations thereof as its own contribution to
the cooperative market development effort represents a great oppor-
tunity for the U.S. Cooperator to obtain third party contributions, in
7 7 U.S.C.A. § 1704 (West Supp. 1992).
8 Public Law 480 has three significant titles. Title I, which is relevant to the Cooper-
ator program, provides for concessional sales of surplus commodities. See infra note 61.
9 As early as 1961 Congress began appropriating money to make up the difference
between the revenues generated under Title I of P.L. 480 and the amounts used in the
operation of the Cooperator program. Subsequent years saw a continuation of the process
of appropriating money for the Cooperator program until, eventually, the Cooperator
funding came entirely from appropriations. KAREN Z. ACKERMAN & MARK E. SMITH, COM-
MODITY ECONOMICS Div., ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., AGRICULTURAL
EXPORT PROGRAMS: BACKGROUND FOR 1990 FARM LEGISLATION, 36 (1990) [hereinafter
ACKERMAN].
10 From the context of the legislation it is clear that the surplus agricultural commod-
ities referred to are not surplus stocks of government-owned commodities, but privately
owned stocks of commodities resulting from surplus production capacity in the United
States.
11 7 C.F.R. § 11.51(b) (1991).
12 JAMES 0. HOWARD ET AL., U.S. AGRICULTURAL EXPORT DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL,
PARTNERS IN DEVELOPING FARM MARKETS OVERSEAS: A HISTORY OF THE COOPERATIVE PRO-
GRAM BETWEEN U.S. AGRICULTURAL COMMODITY ORGANIZATIONS AND THE FOREIGN AGRI-
CULTURAL SERVICE, 4, 5 (1989) [hereinafter HOWARD].
13 7 C.F.R. § 11.51(c) (1991) (emphasis added).
554 [VOL. 18
MARKET PROMOTION PROGRAM
cash or in kind, from foreign distributors, governments or others
who have an interest in developing the foreign market for the U.S.
commodity. 14
The efforts of the Cooperator to develop the foreign markets
are governed by a "Cooperative Project Agreement" that is entered
into pursuant to the Cooperative Program Agreement. 15 Pursuant
to the Cooperative Project Agreement, the Cooperator conducts a
"Cooperative Project" which consists of market development activi-
ties with the support of the FAS administered funding. 16
Acceptable market development activities under the Coopera-
tive Program Agreements are defined as trade servicing, technical
assistance to potential or actual foreign buyers, and consumer pro-
motion.' 7 Trade servicing consists of activities designed to demon-
strate or to promote a U.S. commodity or product or to influence
foreign commodity traders, importers, wholesalers, distributors, pro-
moters, and government officials, to handle, promote or purchase
the U.S. agricultural commodity or product. 18 Technical assistance
addresses "problems related to the sale, movement, processing,
marketing or utilization of U.S. agricultural products."19 Consumer
promotion activities involve activities designed to reach the ultimate
consumer by changing their attitudes toward or making them aware
of the advantages of U.S. agricultural commodities and products. 20
The technical assistance and trade servicing functions have been the
main focus of the Cooperator program while the consumer promo-
tion aspect has comprised less than twenty percent of the program. 2'
The "Cooperative Projects" are conducted by the Cooperator
and are carried out under annual marketing plans which are budg-
eted over a five-year period. 22 This five-year budgeting process
helps maintain continuity in the Cooperative Projects and permits
the successful implementation of multi-year Cooperative Projects. 23
The Cooperator marketing plans must contain detailed information
on trade constraints and export projections, and descriptions of how
the marketing plan will work to overcome or alleviate the con-
14 The foreign contributors are known as Third Party Cooperators and are most
often businesses, rather than governments. HOWARD, supra note 12, at 23.
B 7 C.F.R. § 11.51(c) (1991).
16 Id.
17 FOREIGN AGRIC. SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., FOREIGN AGRICULTURAL SERVICE
GUIDELINES, 11 FASG § 105.1 (October 1985).
18 Id. at § 105.1, § 105.1 Exhibit A.
19 Id.
20 Id. Eligible consumer promotion activities consist of activities such as media adver-
tising, trade fair promotions, public relations activities and point of sale promotions. Inel-
igible expenses are things such as price discounting, travel, entertainment, salaries and
product samples. Id.; see also ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 34.
21 ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 34.
22 Id.
23 Id.
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straints. 2 4 Historically, the contribution of resources to the Cooper-
ative Projects has been one third from the FAS, one third from the
Cooperator and one third from foreign third-party cooperators. 25
3. Export Incentive Program
The Cooperator program did not seem to work effectively for
many of the High Value Products (HVPs) such as fruits and vegeta-
bles. As a result, the Fruit and Vegetable Division of the FAS,
through the Cooperator program, developed and introduced a pilot
project in 1969 to promote branded products rather than generic
commodities. 26 In 1971, this pilot project became an entire sub-pro-
gram within the Cooperator program. 27 Known as the Export Incen-
tive Program (EIP), this initiative focuses on HVPs, and takes a
radically different approach from the regular Cooperator program.
EIP agreements are made with private companies to promote
branded products and are exclusively conducted as consumer pro-
motion activities. 28
III. Agricultural Development and Trade Promotion Programs
In contrast to the long-term export market development focus
of the Cooperator program, other federal export development and
trade promotion programs have been oriented towards activities
with immediate results, such as direct credit, credit guarantees, di-
rect export subsidies, food aid, domestic price support and disposi-
tion of surplus commodities. In 1982, as U.S. agricultural exports
began declining rapidly, the export-promotion policies of the United
States were labeled as "antiquated" by the Chairman of the Center
for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University. 29
Since that statement was made, several, initiatives have been ad-
vanced and a number of programs have been introduced, others re-
vamped and yet others revived. A brief review of these programs will
illustrate their difference from the market development programs,
24 The marketing plans are submitted by the Cooperators to the FAS at the begin-
ning of each year. Only activities approved by the FAS subsequent to the submission of
the marketing plans are reimbursable. The Cooperator may take up to 12 months to im-
plement the marketing plan and 12 more months to submit claims for reimbursement for
activities conducted in the previous plan year. Id.
25 All domestic administrative costs must be born by the Cooperators. Id.
26 HOWARD, supra note 12, at 57.
27 ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 4, 32.
28 ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 34.
29 The statement that the U.S. export-promotion policies are antiquated was appar-
ently based on the premise that the relative decline in U.S. exports from a 28 percent share
of world markets in 1962 to a 20 percent share of world markets in 1980 was in some way a
result of the failure of the United States to implement policies and programs to effectively
address the decline. David M. Abshire, Introduction to PENELOPE HARTLAND-THUNBERG &
MORis H. CRAWFORD, GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR ExPoRTs: A SECOND-BEST ALTERNATIVE,
ix (1982).
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thus putting the TEA and MPP programs in the overall context of
the agricultural trade policy of the United States.
Agricultural export promotion programs can be broken down
into several categories.30 The principal categories that effectively
encompass most of the programs are market development, price
subsidies, direct credit, credit guarantees, and food aid. A catch-all
miscellaneous category is required for those few programs, such as
the Barter program that do not fall easily or naturally within the prin-
ciple categories. Some of the broader programs are designed to
span several categories, others are more narrowly, focused and fit
only one category. 3'
A. Market Development
The primary focus of this Article is a review and discussion of
the Targeted Export Assistance program and the Market Promotion
Program. Necessarily included is a discussion of the Cooperator
program. The MPP and the Cooperator program are the backbone
of the U.S. agricultural market development activities.
1. U.S. Agricultural Trade and Development Missions
The objective of the U.S. Agricultural Trade and Development
Missions program, implemented in 1988, is to develop stronger agri-
cultural trade ties with countries that are eligible to participate in
established U.S. trade or food aid programs.3 2 Stronger ties are de-
veloped by sending trade missions to explore future possibilities for
initiatives and programs, determining ways of effectively using ex-
isting programs, providing technical assistance and working on im-
mediate commitments for commodity sales and food assistance
programs.33 Missions are led by the FAS with participants drawn
from the USDA, the United States Department of State, the United
States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the pri-
vate sector.34 Mission participants from the private sector are not
paid, but are reimbursed per diem and travel expenses.3 5
30 The definitions of categories used in this paper are adopted directly from ACKER-
MAN, supra note 9.
31 This program review will focus on the programs that are currently in effect and
operative. All were in effect at the time the TEA program was created, or they were cre-
ated simultaneously with the TEA program. Many other programs have come and gone,
but their treatment in this article will be restricted to a mere mention at most.
32 7 U.S.C.A. § 1736bb(a) (West 1988 & Supp. 1993).
33 7 U.S.C. § 1736bb(b) (1988). See also FOREIGN AGRIC. SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC.,
U.S. AGRICULTURE TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT MISSIONS PROGRAM FACT SHEET (rev. Sept.
1990).
34 7 U.S.C.A. § 1736bb(b)(1) (West 1988 & Supp. 1991). Private sector participants
were drawn from Cooperator program participants, cooperatives, private voluntary orga-
nizations and other entities. 7 U.S.C.A. § 1736bb(b)(2) (West 1988 & Supp. 1991).
35 7 U.S.C.A. 1736bb(d) (West 1988 & Supp. 1991).
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2. Export Enhancement Program
Introduced in 1985 by the FAS, the Export Enhancement Pro-
gram (EEP) has been a major trade policy program since its incep-
tion. 36 Congress codified the EEP in the 1985 Farm Bill. 3 7 In clear
contrast to the TEA program, which was also authorized in the 1985
Farm Bill, the EEP is unabashedly an export subsidy program.
The Export Enhancement Program was intended to perform
three basic functions: "challenge unfair trade practices that hurt U.S.
exports, especially those of the European Community (EC); en-
courage serious negotiations on agricultural trade under the aus-
pices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT); and
boost U.S. agricultural exports."3 8 The mechanism for accomplish-
ing these objectives is the EEP bonus. This bonus is a payment (sub-
sidy) to U.S. exporters to enable them to sell specifically targeted
commodities to specifically targeted destinations. 39 The subsidy is
36 Not only has the EEP been one of the major programs in the federal government's
arsenal of export enhancement and trade policy programs, it has like so many of the
others, been the source of some significant problems for the Administration. Once the
Administration created the EEP to implement one aspect of the broad mandate of the
Commodity Credit Corporation Charter, Congress immediately stepped in and attempted
to take control of the EEP, both from a policy and administrative perspective. The imme-
diate incorporation of the EEP into the Food Security Act of 1985 was the first step in
which Congress articulated policy goals for the EEP and established budgetary parame-
ters. The Food Security Improvement Act of 1988 and the Omnibus Trade and Competi-
tiveness Act of 1988 both established further funding constraints and guidelines.
Hearings in Congress to review the EEP in 1989 and 1990 are studded with statements
such as the following found in the Congressional Research Service Report to Congress
stating that the "claims of EEP accomplishments cannot be proven or refuted definitively."
Review of the Export Enhancement Program, (1989): Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Wheat, Soy-
beans, and Feed Grains of the House Comm. on Agric., 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 141 (1989) (Ep-
stein, S.B. Congressional Research Service Report for Congress: Will The Export
Enhancement Program Survive?). Extensive discussion and opposing points of view are
provided by the above quoted report, the report of the Administrator of the FAS and the
report of the General Accounting Office's review of the EEP. This problem brings to mind
the serious difficulty that is faced in evaluating the success of the various programs in
meeting their policy objectives as articulated by the Congress and the Administration. Is it
possible that the formulation of the policy objectives is in some way deficient?
37 The EEP was originally announced by the USDA under the CCC charter authority
(Commodity Credit Corporation Charter Act of 1948), in May of 1985 in response to large
and increasing commodity stocks held by the CCC, and dwindling export markets. Id. The
EEP was shortly thereafter codified in the Food Security Act of 1985, which passed in
December of the same year. 7 U.S.C.A. § 5651 (West Supp. 1991).
38 Review of the Export Enhancement Program (1990): Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm.
Department Operations, Research, and Foreign Agriculture and the Subcomm. on Wheat, Soybeans, and
Feed Grains of the House Comm. on Agic., 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1990) (statement by F.
Paul Dickerson, Associate Administrator and General Sales Manager, Foreign Agricultural
Service) [hereinafter EEPJoint Hearing 1990]. Additional requirements imposed on the
EEP were that it create a net increase in U.S. commodity exports over what would have
been experienced in the absence of the program, that it provide a net benefit to the econ-
omy, that exports under the program be targeted particularly to challenge EC exports and
that it do this without incurring budget outlays beyond what would have been expended in
the absence of the program.
39 The targeted commodities and the targeted countries are identified and selected
by the CCC. The CCC will issue periodical press releases announcing "initiatives" to facil-
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designed to make U.S. exporters competitive with their subsidized
competitors. The bonus is authorized to be made either by payment
in kind from Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) stocks, or by ge-
neric commodity certificates issued by the CCC and redeemable for
commodities, or even by cash payments. 40 The amount of the bonus
is represented by the "difference between the landed cost of the U.S.
commodity in the target country and the landed cost of our
competitors. ' 4 '
3. Dairy Export Incentive Program
The Dairy Export Incentive program (DEIP) provides U.S. dairy
product exporters with the CCC generic commodity certificates as a
bonus designed to make the exporters price competitive with that of
foreign exporters who are subsidized by their countries. 42 This per-
mits U.S. exporters to compete with subsidized foreign exporters,
and purports to counter or offset the unfair trade practices of those
foreign exporting nations. An additional objective of the program is
to develop, expand or maintain export markets for the covered dairy
products. It is important to note that this program is very narrow in
the scope of commodities it covers. 43 As a direct export subsidy pro-
gram the DEIP stands in sharp contrast to the TEA program.
4. Sunflower and Cottonseed Oil Assistance Programs
Also conducted as bonus programs, the Sunflowerseed Oil
Assistance Program (SOAP), authorized by the Rural Development,
itate agricultural exports to targeted markets. The office of the General Sales Manager
("GSM") of the FAS subsequently issues an "Invitation for Offers" which identifies the
targeted market and the eligible commodities and describes additional details relating to
eligible commodity quantity limitations, quality requirements, eligible buyers and all other
requirements and limitations. After the Invitation is issued, exporters who have contracts
with eligible buyers may submit an offer to the CCC detailing how much of a "bonus" is
required to make the exporter competitive with foreign subsidized exporters. After receiv-
ing the offers, the CCC selects the offers it will accept, enters into Agreements with the
chosen exporters and makes bonus payments to those exporters based upon proof that the
physical transaction has actually taken place in accordance with the requirements of the
Agreement. Export Enhancement Program Operations, 56 Fed. Reg. 25,011 (1991) (to be
codified at 7 C.F.R. § 1494.101). Between the time the EEP was announced in May of
1985 and it came up for renewal consideration before Congress in May of 1990, 105 Initia-
tives were announced for 12 commodities and 65 countries, with CCC bonuses of $2.72
billion awarded. ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 7.
40 7 U.S.C.A. 5651(b)(1) (West Supp. 1991). All payments actually made by the CCC
under this program have been in the form of generic commodity certificates. FOREIGN
AGRIC. SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., EXPORT ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM FACT SHEET 2 (rev.
April 1991).
41 EEPJoint Hearing 1990, supra note 38, at 41.
42 The generic commodity certificates issued under the DEIP are paid to the U.S.
exporter after the approved export is made, are for a specified value, and are redeemable
for designated commodities at the CCC warehouse. FOREIGN AGRIC. SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF
AGRIC., DAILY EXPORT INCENTIVE PROGRAM: FACT SHEET (rev. March 1991).
43 Id.
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Agriculture and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1988 and
the Cottonseed Oil Assistance Program (COAP), added to the SOAP
by the Agricultural Appropriations Act of 1989, assists in exports of
quantities of these oils to targeted countries such as Egypt and
Algeria. 44
B. Direct Credit and Credit Guarantees
1. Export Credit Guarantee Program and Intermediate Export
Credit Guarantee Program
The Export Credit Guarantee Program (GSM 102) and the In-
termediate Export Credit Guarantee Program (GSM 103) were origi-
nally introduced in 1981 and 1985 respectively.45 These export
credit guarantee programs, as opposed to direct credit programs, are
designed to encourage U.S. banks to provide credit to U.S. exporters
selling U.S. agricultural commodities on credit terms,46 and to en-
courage U.S. exporters to explore export opportunities which they
might otherwise ignore due to perceived risk.47 Not all export trans-
actions are eligible for a GSM guarantee. In order to be eligible, a
sale must be of an eligible commodity to an eligible country.48 The
program is administered by the FAS and funded through the CCC.
The U.S. government, through the CCC, agrees to pay U.S. export-
ers or their assigns (financial institutions), in the event that the for-
eign bank, for any reason, fails to honor sight or time drafts
presented pursuant to the terms of the letter of credit it issued on
44 ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 41.
45 Although the CCC charter, which was passed in 1948 (Pub. L. No. 806), provided
authority for the CCC to export or cause to be exported agricultural commodities, or to
aid in the development of export markets for agricultural commodities, it did not under-
take to provide export credit guarantees until 1956 when it implemented the Export
Credit Sales Program(GSM-5). Since the CCC has no staff or facilities to administer the
programs itself, other agencies of the USDA administer programs for the CCC. The for-
eign sales credit programs of the CCC are administered by the General Sales Manger of
the Foreign Agricultural Service, thus the designation GSM for those programs. In 1981
the CCC introduced the GSM 102. In the Food Security Act of 1985 Congress mandated
the GSM-103 and dictated the levels of support to be made available by the CCC in the
years 1985-1990 in both GSM-102($500 million to $1 billion per year) and GSM-103($5
billion per year). U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUES-
TERS INTERNATIONAL TRADE: COMMODITY CREDIT CORPORATION'S EXPORT GUARANTEE PRO-
GRAMS (1988).
46 FOREIGN AGRIC. SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., CREDIT PROTECTION FOR U.S. AGRI-
CULTURAL EXPORTERS I (rev. Dec. 1990).
47 By transferring some of the risk of loss due to defaults by foreign banks from the
exporters or their assignees to CCC, GSM-102 and GSM-103 are intended to: facilitate
exportation; forestall or limit declines in exports; permit exporters to meet competition
from other countries; and increase commercial exports of U.S. agricultural commodities.
7 C.F.R. § 1493 (1991).
48 The FAS announces yearly the credit guarantee allocations that will be available
that year. The credit guarantee allocations list the eligible countries and the eligible com-
modities for each eligible country (country-by-commodity credit guarantee allocations).
ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 14, 15.
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behalf of the buyer. 49
The basic distinction between the GSM 102 and GSM 103 pro-
grams is the fact that GSM 102 guarantees payment for sales with
credit terms of six months to three years, while GSM 103 guarantees
payment for sales with credit terms of more than three years but not
more than ten years. GSM 102 guarantees amounted to nearly $4
billion in 1990, whereas, GSM 103 guarantees amounted to over
$332 million. GSM 102 covered exports to twenty-five markets,
whereas, GSM 103 covered exports to only nine markets. 50
Because these are export credit guarantee programs, the actual
payout by the CCC is limited to the times when the foreign banks fail
to pay. To qualify for GSM 102 or GSM 103 guarantees, the foreign
market must offer "good prospects for market development for U.S.
agricultural products" and "be in a country whose foreign exchange
reserves or debt situation may make repayment prospects more
'risky' than the private U.S. banking community would like, but
which still offers a reasonable prospect for repayment. '51
C. Export-Import Bank of the United States
The purpose of the Export-Import Bank of the United States
(Eximbank) is to "facilitate export financing of U.S. goods and serv-
49 The CCC rules for the GSM 102 and GSM 103 programs dictate the structure of
the transactions receiving credit guarantees from the CCC. The importer must provide an
irrevocable letter of credit in favor of the exporter from an approved foreign bank specify-
ing the terms of payment and meeting other detailed requirements. The exporter then
applies for a guarantee of payment by the CCC for the letter of credit in case of default by
the foreign bank for any reason, be it commercial or political. Once the guarantee is
granted, participating domestic banks will pay the exporter and accept an assignment of
the letter of credit. CCC Export Credit Guarantee Programs 56 Fed. Reg. 25,998 (1991)
(interim rule, to be codified at 7 C.F.R. § 1493).
50 FOREIGN AGRIC. SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., CREDIT PROTECTION FOR U.S. AGRI-
CULTURAL EXPORTERS I (rev. Dec. 1990).
51 Id. But see U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE: IRAQ'S PARTICI-
PATION IN THE U.S. AGRICULTURAL EXPORT PROGRAMS (1990), in which the GAO criticizes
the FAS for approving guarantees to Iraq in the administration's tilt toward Iraq, when the
risk analysis indicated too high a risk to make the guarantees under normal program pa-
rameters. As noted in testimony before Congress, the FAS was aware of certain risk fac-
tors that mitigated against the approval of guarantees for Iraq in 1988. Iraq's Participation
in the Commodity Credit Corporation's GSM-1 02/103 Export Credit Guarantee Programs: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Department Operations, Research and Foreign Agriculture of the House Comm.
on Agriculture, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (statement of Allan I. Mendelowitz, Director,
Trade, Energy and Finance Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division,
General Accounting Office) [hereinafter GAO Testimony on Iraq]. In spite of the exces-
sive risk factors, GSM guarantees were made to Iraq based on foreign policy and Agricul-
tural trade considerations in 1988 through 1990. GAO Testimony on Iraq, 12, 13. After
1990, legislative and regulatory changes prohibited granting guarantees on policy
grounds, but required FAS to make the guarantee decisions based on risk, export en-
hancement or maintenance and competitiveness considerations. See supra note 47. A re-
cent GAO report, U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Loan Guarantees: Export Credit
Guarantee Program's Costs are High (1993), criticizes the GSM programs as being costly
to the U.S. as a result of past and expected defaults by Iraq and the U.S.S.R. Defaults by
Iraq are expected to be at the 2 billion dollar level.
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ices by neutralizing the effect of export credit subsidies from other
governments and by absorbing reasonable credit risks that are be-
yond the current reach of the private sector." 52 Eximbank is not an
agriculturally oriented institution, but it, nevertheless, provides sig-
nificant assistance for U.S. agricultural exports under three pro-
grams: direct loans, credit guarantees, and payment insurance. 53
Agriculture is one of the industries that Eximbank supports,
although there are some limitations on its support for agricultural
exports. 54 Although Eximbank is federally chartered, it is run as a
profit making institution. 55 The programs are currently funded out
of the revenues which are generated by the fees charged participants
for the services rendered. Eximbank provided assistance in export-
ing $139.6 million in agricultural commodities and products and
$412.5 million in agricultural equipment, supplies and services in
Fiscal Year 1990.56 This is in comparison to total Eximbank assisted
exports of almost $9.3 billion. 57
D. Food Aid
1. Public Law 480 - Food For Peace
Public Law 480, P.L. 480, is also known as the Mickey Leland
Food for Peace program. 58 Passed in the Senate in 1953, in the
House in 1954, signed into law in 1954, it was first implemented in
1955. 59 This massive program has evolved over the years and has
52 JOHN D. MACOMBER, CHAIRMAN, EXIMBANK, AN INTRODUCTION TO EXIMBANK
(undated).
55 The Eximbank was chartered by the Congress with the Export-Import Bank Act of
1945. 12 U.S.C. § 635 (1988). However, that was not the beginning of the Eximbank. It
was originally organized in 1934 under Exec. Order No. 6581, February 2, 1934, as a
District of Columbia banking corporation. Through a series of Acts of Congress it was
continued until the passage of the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945. A thorough discus-
sion of the legislative history of the Eximbank can be found in two booklets published by
the Bank: EXIMBANK, EXPORT-IMPORT BANK ACT OF 1945, AS AMENDED THROUGH OCTOBER
15, 1986; and EXIMBANK, EXPORT-IMPORT BANK ACT OF 1945, As AMENDED THROUGH OCTO-
BER 15, 1986; SUPPLEMENT: AMENDMENTS THROUGH MARCH 1, 1990 (undated).
54 AN EXIMBANK HANDOUT, EXIMBANK, COMPARISON OF MAJOR FEATURES OF PROGRAMS
OFFERED BY EXIMBANK/FCIA AND COMMODITY CREDIT CORPORATION FOR SUPPORT OF BULK
AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES (1990) provides a valuable review and comparison of the
terms and conditions of FCIA's (Foreign Credit Insurance Association) Short-Term Credit
Insurance Coverage, FCIA's Bank Letter of Credit Insurance and the CCC's Export Credit
Guarantee Program (GSM-102). Apparently there is not much overlap of the programs.
55 What is particularly interesting is that the Eximbank credit guarantee programs
can be tailored to cover commercial and political risks. EXIMBANK, EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OF
THE UNITED STATES MEDIUM- AND LONG-TERM EXPORT LOANS AND GUARANTEES PART I:
PROGRAM DESCRIPTION 1 (1991). (EIB Form 87-14).
56 EXIMBANK, 1990 ANNUAL REPORT, EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OF THE UNITED STATES 12
(1990).
57 Id. at 15.
58 This is now known as the Mickey Leland Food for Peace program, in honor of the
Texas Congressman who lost his life in a plane crash in Ethiopia in 1989 while trying to
ascertain how we could do better in that situation.
59 American agricultural output has increased over time, but the productivity was re-
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been the delivery mechanism for an enormous volume of surplus ag-
ricultural commodities exported from the United States. P.L. 480 is
an amorphous and somewhat confusing set of programs rather than
a narrowly defined single purpose program. Over time, significant
changes have been made by legislation, with some parts being re-
moved, others being added and yet more being combined with other
programs. 60 It was originally passed with three major Titles, was
later expanded to four major Titles and has now combined some ac-
tivities to leave it once again with three major Titles. 6 1 It is truly the
markable in the World War II era and during the subsequent period of the Marshall plan
and food aid to Europe before its agricultural output came back to normal levels. The
resulting decline in export markets left the vigorous U.S. agricultural production sector
with excess supplies and, consequently, falling prices. Congress considered many pro-
posed remedies in the 1953-54 session. Public Law 480 was originally introduced in the
Senate as S. 2475 on July 24, 1953, and passed the Senate on July 28, 1953. It was signed
into law almost one full year later. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS, PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMM. ON FOREIGN AGRICULTURAL POL'Y, COMM. ON AG-
RICULTURE, NUTRITION, AND FORESTRY, 96TH CONG., IST SESS. (1978), FOOD FOR PEACE,
1954-1978-MAJOR CHANGES IN LEGISLATION (Comm. Print 1979) [hereinafter MAJOR
CHANGES].
60 For an effective review of the evolution of P.L. 480, up to 1978, refer to MAJOR
CHANGES, supra note 59. For more recent developments, see Issues Related to the Reauthoriza-
tion of Food for Peace and Agricultural Export Promotion Programs, Hearings and Markup on H. R.
3950 before the Subcomm. on International Economic Policy and Trade of the Comm. on Foreign Af-
fairs, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. 60-65 (1990).
61 Title I.
Foodfor Peace. Under Title I (known as Food for Peace), of this program, commodities
are provided to friendly, needy nations on a concessionary basis. Sales are paid for in the
currency of the nation purchasing the food and repayment periods for the commodities
can extend over a forty year period. Title I also deals with the utilization of funds realized
under Public Law 480 for market development. This is where the Cooperator program
enters the picture. In 1981 Title I was expanded to include development programs for
literacy and health programs for the rural poor.
Title II.
Title II provides for emergency food relief on a donation, rather than concessionary
sale basis. This was the humanitarian aspect of the program and was not limited to
friendly nations. Commodities from CCC stockpiles are used to provide assistance in
times of dire need, disaster or emergency.
Section 416(b). Section 416(b) is a food aid donation program under which a quantity
of foodstuffs is made available to needy nations. This is the next most significant food aid
program sponsored by the United States. It predated P.L. 480 by about 5 years (it was
introduced in 1949), was supplanted by Title II of P.L. 480, was reintroduced on a limited
basis in 1982 and was expanded and incorporated into the function of Title III of P.L. 480
in the Food Security Act of 1985.
Title III.
Barter. The Barter program was authorized under the CCC charter and was con-
ducted pursuant to that charter from 1949-54. The Barter program was brought under
P.L. 480 and was the original heart of Title III of P.L. 480 in 1954. The idea was to barter
agricultural commodities for scarce strategic materials. The Barter program was con-
ducted under P.L. 480 until 1963 at which time it was continued under the CCC charter
authority. The Barter program was suspended in 1973. The Food Security Act of 1985
authorized the Barter program to be conducted once again under P.L. 480.
Food for Development. The Food for Development concept was introduced in 1977 as a
new aspect of Title III. The proceeds from the concessional sales under Title I may be
used, on specific terms, to conduct specified types of development projects and activities.
The objective of the Food for Development program is to develop agricultural production
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backbone of the U.S. food aid programs, 62 but is also used as a tool
for long-term market development and credit guarantees and has
been the vehicle for barter procurement of strategic materials.
P.L. 480 has, as a matter of policy, several basic objectives. The
policy objectives of the original P.L. 480, articulated on the floors of
the Senate and House, were disposal of surplus U.S. commodities,
reduction in storage costs, facilitation of the convertibility of cur-
rency, promotion of stability in U.S. agriculture, expansion of com-
mercial export markets, promotion of the foreign policy of the
United States, and assistance to friendly nations to stem the tide of
communism. 63 Subsequent policy objectives of P.L. 480 were ex-
pressed as the world situation changed over time. The 1959 amend-
ments to P.L. 480 were motivated by policy objectives which placed
increased emphasis on the humanitarian aspects of the program.
Previous objectives concentrated on the use of P.L. 480 to solve the
surplus and storage problems of the United States. In the early
1960s the humanitarian aspects of P.L. 480 were clearly emphasized
in the administration of the programs. After several years of this em-
phasis, the Food for Peace Act of 1966 was passed, motivated by the
policy objective of increased development assistance. 64 The policy
capabilities and the structure to adequately utilize those capabilities, rather than to de-
velop markets for U.S. commodities.
Under specific conditions, Title III of P.L. 480 authorizes forgiveness of debt incurred
by nations purchasing commodities under Title I.
Food for Progress. This program was instituted in the Food Security Act of 1985 as
another food aid by donation program under Title III but found its authority in Section
4 16(b) of the Agricultural Act of 1949, so is in effect a revival of the old Section 4 16(b) that
was supplanted by Title II in 1954.
Title IV.
Modifications of P.L. 480 in 1959 added Title IV permitting the extension of long-
term credit for dollar sales of commodities rather than sales for foreign currencies. The
purpose was to provide an alternative to sales for foreign currencies and thus slow down
the buildup of foreign currencies held by the United States. Additional provisions of the
1959 Act provided for Food for Work projects and grants for the buildup of stockpiles in
foreign countries. The Food for Peace Act of 1966 made significant modifications to P.L.
480, one of which was to combine Title IV into Title I.
MAJOR CHANGES, supra note 59; ACKERMAN, supra note 9.
62 The Food for Peace program has been credited with saving the lives of millions
around the world. Mary McGrory, Sharing The Nation's Bounty, WASH. POST, Nov. 23, 1989,
at Al.
63 The effort to arrest the spread of communism through efforts such as P.L. 480 was
described by some as using food as a weapon. 100 CONG. REC. H8287 (daily ed. June 15,
1954) (statement of Rep. Marshall).
64 Some significant U.S. factions, such as President Lyndon Johnson, were particu-
larly concerned that humanitarian assistance without development assistance would create
a long-term detrimental reliance on the United States as a food supplier. LYNDON B.JOHN-
SON, A WAR ON HUNGER, H.R. Doc. No. 378, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 4 (1966). Ultimately
the most significant change in focus of P.L. 480 from the 1966 amendments was an added
directive from Congress that the administration of the program be oriented to emphasize
participation by countries that were engaged in development projects. In 1968 hearings
on legislative amendments to P.L. 480, reaffirmed the original concept that the conces-
sional sales and donation programs of P.L. 480 would eventually be supplanted by com-
mercial marketing of U.S. commodities as nations "graduated" from their more
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objectives of the Food for Peace program have been articulated more
recently as "influencing development strategy and policies, influenc-
ing the undertaking of specific development projects, feeding the
hungry, promoting economic development, promoting U.S. agricul-
tural exports, and furthering U.S. foreign policy.' 6 5
E. Miscellaneous
1. Barter
The Barter program was in existence prior to P.L. 480, but was
drawn under its umbrella in 1954.66 In the early years it was used to
help the United States acquire stockpiles of foreign-produced strate-
gic materials. 67 From 1963 until the program was suspended in
1973, it was used to assist the U.S. military and other agencies in
procuring goods abroad. 68 The policy goals of Congress in reviving
the Barter program were articulated in the Farm Bill of 1990 as the
expansion of agricultural trade.6 9
IV. Export Program Review
Historically, the United States has maintained a large agricul-
tural export base. It is calculated that from 1920 until the early
1970s, over twenty percent and as much as thirty percent of all U.S.
exports have been agricultural commodities. 70
While the United States is still the world's largest agricultural
dependent status by virtue of the development assistance provided by P.L. 480. The early
1970s saw a dramatic decrease in food surpluses and a corresponding reduction in food
aid under P.L. 480. The combination of these factors and the increased use of P.L. 480 to
support the U.S. war efforts in Southeast Asia resulted in directives of Congress in 1972-
74 that the uses of P.L. 480 should be directed to humanitarian aid rather than be diverted
by foreign policy considerations. As a follow up to these directives in 1975 Congress
passed some significant amendments to P.L. 480 in the International Development and
Food Assistance Act of 1975. The policy considerations of humanitarian food aid and
development assistance were primary motivations for the changes at that time. In effect,
Congress continued the trend that had been developing over the years to take tighter
control of the way in which the legislation was implemented to assure that the implementa-
tion was consistent with the Congressional policy goals rather than the Administration's
policy goals. MAJOR CHANGES, supra note 59. In 1981, the Agriculture and Food Act of
1981 again emphasized the development objectives of P.L. 480 and implemented new de-
velopment programs under Title I. The clear policy thrust of the 1985 and 1990 amend-
ments to P.L. 480 has been the market development theme. ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at
30, 31.
65 Issues Related to the Reauthorization of Food for Peace and Agricultural Export Promotion
Programs, Hearings and Alarkup on H. R. 3950 before the Subcomm. on International Economic Policy
and Trade of the Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 60-65 (1990) (statement of
Allan I. Mendelowitz, Director, Trade, Energy and Finance Issues, National Security and
International Affairs Division, General Accounting Office).
66 Section 416(d) of the Agriculture Act of 1949 included Barter provisions. 7
U.S.C.A. § 1431(d) (West 1988 and Supp. 1991).
67 ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 30.
68 Id.
69 Pub. L. No. 100-418 § 4309.
70 R.C. STANLEY, FOOD FOR PEACE: HOPE AND REALITY OF U.S. FOOD AID 3 (1973).
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exporting nation, accounting for approximately one-sixth of the
world's agricultural trade, 71 it has faced some difficulty in maintain-
ing consistent levels of agricultural exports. 72 Many countries pro-
vide assistance for their agricultural exporters to make them more
competitive. 73 Such assistance can take many forms which the
United States considers to be unfair.74 Because the export markets
are perceived to be so important to U.S. agriculture, Congress, as
previously noted, attempted to address the trends of declining agri-
cultural exports and increasing foreign unfair trade practices affect-
ing U.S. agricultural exports by introducing programs to assist U.S.
agricultural exporters in the 1985 Farm Bill.
75
The TEA program, now the MPP, and the long established Co-
operator program do not provide the direct price subsidies of the
EEP and the other bonus programs. Nor do they provide the direct
loans, credit guarantees or credit insurance as can be found in the
Eximbank offerings, or the credit guarantees found in GSM 102 and
GSM 103. They also omit the humanitarian, development, conces-
sionary sales, and food aid thrust of the Food for Peace and related
programs. Rather, they aim at developing foreign markets for U.S.
agricultural products.
71 FOREIGN AGRIC. SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., U.S. FARMERS' EXPORT ARM (rev.
Dec. 1990).
72 H.R. REP. No. 271, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 9 (1985), reprinted in 1985
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1112, 1113.
73 Id. at 68-70, reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1172-1174.
74 For a detailed description of the trading practices engaged in by our trading part-
ners and competitors that are considered by the U.S. to be unfair see OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 1991 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOR-
EIGN TRADE BARRIERS (1991). For a sense of the feeling in Congress regarding unfair
trade practices, see Agricultural Export Trade, 1983, Hearings on S. 14, S. 18, S. 77, S. 100, S,
124 (Title V), S. 251 & S. 398, S. 490 and S. 575 (Title XI) Before the Senate Comm. on Agricul-
ture, Trade and Forestry, 98th Cong., I st Sess. 1, 1-2 (1983) (statement of Hon. Jesse Helms,
U.S. Senator).
75 This further underscores the importance of increasing our focus on marketing,
especially overseas marketing. But it should be stressed that this will add further complex-
ities to the process of developing farm legislation. Over the last few decades, the farm
policy environment has become more and more complex. In the early years, the trade-offs
were primarily between different sectors of the total economy-more for agriculture
meant less for other sectors. Today, the trade-offs are within agriculture-higher price
supports mean greater farm income but less foreign sales, and more excess production
capacity and more federal expenditures to hold down farm output or store the excess.
Farm policy has become complex for other reasons as well. Food is now an interna-
tional issue, made so by the shortages of the early 1970's and the continuing growth of
population in most of the developing world. As an international issue, farm policy has
taken on characteristics associated with foreign policy, international economic policy, and
even national security. These additional elements increase the number of interested par-
ticipants in farm policy deliberations and food program administration and make the dia-
logue more complicated. Perhaps the most succinct description of the whole farm and
food policy agenda is that U.S. foreign policy has always been complex, and U.S. farm
policy is slowly joining it. L.V. MAYER, AGRICULTURAL POLICY IN AN CHANGING DOMESTIC
AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT, UNITED STATES AGRICULTURAL POLICY 1985 AND BE-
YOND 150-51 (.S. Hillman ed., 1985).
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The rationale for government involvement in developing for-
eign markets for agricultural commodities was articulated before a
hearing of the United States Industrial Commission in 1900.76 The
rationale expressed was that the farmer does not have the means at
his disposal to develop foreign markets without the aid of govern-
ment, that industry, although more capable than agriculture of de-
veloping foreign markets, has received more government aid in the
process; and that the U.S. government had not done nearly enough
to develop foreign agricultural markets, especially when compared to
the actions of other national governments in expending time, effort,
and money developing foreign agricultural markets. 77 Half a century
later, the Cooperator program was introduced and provided the fo-
cus for some long-term market development, but the real effort to
develop foreign markets at the grass roots consumer level arrived
with the TEA program in 1985. It provided for a touch of Madison
Avenue overseas, some real government assistance, and support in
direct consumer promotion activities. The Cooperator program set
the stage. A discussion of the TEA program and its successor, the
MPP follows in detail.
V. A Case Study Of U.S. Agricultural Export Promotion
A. The Evolution of the TEA Program and the MPP
1. Origin and History of the TEA Program
One of the flurry of programs to come out of the 1985 Farm Bill,
the TEA program was intended to help counter foreign unfair trade
practices by developing foreign markets for U.S. agriculture. 78
While the TEA program was repealed and replaced in the 1990 Farm
Bill by the MPP, it continued to govern certain existing multi-year
contracts, and it is the key to understanding the MPP. 79
The original legislation authorizing the TEA program does not
give any guidance on the development, organization or administra-
tion of the program. The text of the relevant U.S. Code section
reads as follows:
Funds or commodities made available for use under this section
shall be used by the Secretary only to counter or offset the adverse
effect on the export of a United States agricultural commodity or the
product thereof of a subsidy (as defined in paragraph (2)), import
quotas, or other unfair trade practices of a foreign country.80
76 U.S. DEP'T. OF AGRIC., REPORT No. 67, FOREIGN MARKETS FOR AMERICAN AGRICUL-
TURAL PRODUCTS 44-45 (1901) (testimony of Frank H. Hitchcock, Chairman of the Section
of Foreign Markets before the Industrial Commission (June 13 & 15, 1900)).
77 Id.
78 Food Security Act of 1985 § 1124, 7 U.S.C. § 1736s (1988), repealed by Food, Agri-
culture, Conservation and Trade Act of 1990, 104 Stat. 3702.
79 7 U.S.C.A § 5623 (West Supp. 1991).
80 7 U.S.C. § 1736s(b)(l) (1988).
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This type of Congressional approach is cited as a major reason for
why it is extremely difficult to analyze U.S. agricultural legislation.8 '
The duty of designing the TEA program was placed squarely on
the Secretary of Agriculture. With the minimal program description
found in the legislation, the Secretary had a great deal of latitude in
designing the TEA program. The Secretary delegated the program
design and administration to the Foreign Agricultural Service (the
FAS). How the FAS chose to implement the broad mandate from
Congress is particularly interesting and significant.
The FAS decided that market development was the best way to
accomplish the goals of the TEA program's enabling legislation.
Once that decision was made, it was a natural and logical step for the
FAS to model, in some measure, the TEA program after the Cooper-
ator program,8 2 which, until the advent of the TEA program, was the
only program primarily oriented to export market development.
2. Operation of the TEA Program
As a result, the TEA program became another export market
development program, providing assistance for trade servicing, tech-
nical assistance, and consumer promotion.8 3 Approximately sev-
enty-five percent of the TEA program funds have been used
exclusively in consumer promotion activities, whereas over eighty
percent of the Cooperator program funds are used for technical
assistance and trade servicing activities.8 4
The level of funding for the TEA program was much higher than
81 See GARDNER, supra note 5.
82 The timing of the legislation, leaving little lead time for the USDA to implement a
program to effectively utilize the allocation of $200 million may have had some impact in
persuading the USDA to pattern the program after an existing model. The legislative
history of the TEA program actually shows very little effort on the part of Congress to give
the USDA specific guidance on the implementation of Food Security Act of 1985 § 1124, 7
U.S.C. § 1736s (1988), the section authorizing the TEA program. See S. REP. No. 145,
99th Cong., 1st. Sess. 92, 364, 436 (1985), reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1761, 2030,
2362.
83 Trade servicing involves efforts to influence traders and other distributors to han-
dle or promote U.S. products. Technical assistance involves providing U.S. exporters with
assistance in solving technical problems with the export process and providing foreign
distributors with assistance in use of the products. Consumer promotion involves market-
ing to the prospective consumers of the products in such a way as to change their attitudes
toward and make them aware of the advantages of U.S. agricultural products. U.S. Farm
Policy: Proposals for Budget Savings, 1990: Hearings Before the Task Force on Urgent Fiscal Issues of
the House Comm. on the Budget, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 88 n.3 (1990) (Appendix I to prepared
statement of Allan I. Mendelowitz, Director, Trade, Energy and Finance Issues, National
Security and International Affairs Division, General Accounting Office) [hereinafter GAO
Farm Policy Testimony 1990]; see also Review of GAO's Report on the U.S. Department of Agricul-
ture's Targeted Assistance Program, 1988: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Department Operations,
Research, and Foreign Agriculture of the House Comm. on Agriculture, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 64
(1988) (statement of Allan I. Mendelowitz, Senior Associate Director, National Security
and International Affairs Division) [hereinafter Review of GAOs Report 1988].
84 GAO Farm Policy Testimony 1990, supra note 83, at 88.
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that provided for the Cooperator program.8 5 In 1986 the funding
for the Cooperator program was $34.7 million.8 6 That represented
the peak of funding for the Cooperator program.8 7 The TEA pro-
gram was funded at a level of $110 million per year from 1986 until
1988, and $200 million pet year for 1989 and 1990. The initial legis-
lation allotted $325 million for years 1989 and 1990, but this was
reduced to $200 million.8 8 The MPP had been funded at the $200
million level for 1991 and 1992, but was reduced to $147.7 million in
199389 and President Clinton's economic plan unveiled on February
17, 1993 proposes leaving funding at the 1993 level for the next sev-
eral years. 90 Compensation under the TEA program was authorized
to be paid in dollars or in dollar-denominated generic commodity
certificates which were redeemable for CCC commodities of the
value specified on the certificates. The practice of the CCC was to
make the payments in CCC certificates which the participants sold on
the open market.9 ' Purchasers of the certificates could then redeem
the certificates for CCC commodities.
Although the TEA program was modeled after the Cooperator
program, there were some notable differences, the most significant
of which was the requirement of the TEA program legislation that
the funds be used to counter or to offset unfair trade practices. An
important observation about the nature of the program envisioned
by the FAS is the definition given by the FAS in the TEA Guidelines
to the terms "counter" and "offset" as used in the legislation. 92 The
FAS determined that it would provide TEA funds for activities
designed to "counter" unfair trade practices in "[tihe market re-
sponsible for the unfair trade practice", or "[tihe market(s) which
85 In contrast to the Cooperator program, Congress did not appropriate any money
for the TEA program. Instead, it authorized the CCC to use its commodities to provide
financial support for the TEA program. FOREIGN AGRIC. SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC.,
TARGETED EXPORT ASSISTANCE GUIDELINES, REVISED AND EFFECTIVE OCTOBER 1, 1988
[hereinafter TEAG 1988].
86 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE: REVIEW OF EFFECTIVENESS
OF FAS COOPERATOR MARKET DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL RE-
QUESTERS 8 (1987).
87 The Cooperator program budget in the early 1980s hovered at roughly $18 mil-
lion per year, during 1985 and 1986 exceeded $30 million and by the late 1980s had
subsided to roughly $28 million per year. ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 33.
88 See 7 U.S.C. § 1736s (1988).
89 Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related
agencies Appropriation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-341, 106 Stat. 873 (1992).
90 Executive Office of the President of the United States, A Vision of Change for America,
91, 126 App., tbl. 3 (Feb. 17, 1993).
91 Interestingly, the CCC had permitted the holders of Certificates in other programs
to exchange those certificates for cash from the CCC. However, the CCC did not choose
to permit the exchange of Certificates for cash from the CCC on Certificates issued under
the TEA program. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AGRICULTURAL TRADE: REVIEW OF
TARGETED EXPORT ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS 2, 13,
14 (1988) [hereinafter GAO REPORT 1988].
92 TEAG 1988, supra note 85.
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have been adversely affected by the practice from the viewpoint of
the u.s.[sic] exports." The activities could also be designed to " 'off-
set' the effects of the unfair trade practice by conducting promo-
tional activities in alternative markets." 93 "Alternative markets" are
any markets other than those affected by the unfair trade practices.
For example, 94 if an EC exporting country, such as France, was en-
gaging in an unfair trade practice that harmed a U.S. exporter in a
foreign market, such as Japan, an activity in the offending country,
France, or in the affected market, Japan, designed to counter the un-
fair trade practice could be approved by the FAS under the TEA pro-
gram. Significantly, a market development activity in Korea, India,
Pakistan or in any foreign market other than France or Japan,
designed to offset the unfair trade practice could be approved under
the TEA program. This set of definitions takes into account the pos-
sibility that no effective market development can be accomplished
through head to head competition in the face of the unfair trade
practice being conducted by the foreign exporting country. The af-
fected U.S. exporter was thus given the option of developing addi-
tional markets to offset the ill effects of the unfair trade practice.
The focus of the TEA program was on achieving increased sales
through immediate market development in order to assist U.S. ex-
porters damaged by unfair foreign competition. The Cooperator
program, on the other hand, has focused on long term market devel-
opment. 95 Recognizing the need to serve agricultural interests other
than the few basic commodity groups served by the Cooperator pro-
gram, the FAS focused the TEA program on processed, high value,
and non-traditional products. 96
Although the objectives of the TEA program and the MPP in-
clude increasing sales in the short term, the program was not
designed to actually make direct sales. For those TEA program par-
ticipants who had a little difficulty differentiating between market de-
velopment and direct sales, the acceptable actions were defined and
the unacceptable actions prohibited in conflict of interest rules
promulgated by the FAS and CCC in 1989. 9 7 Direct sales by partici-
pants were prohibited when those direct sales were made during
promotional activities funded in whole or in part by TEA funds. Par-
93 TEAG 1988, supra note 85, at 5-6.
94 There is no ulterior motive in the selection of the country names used in this ex-
ample. The purpose of using actual country names is to avoid the invariably confusing
technique of labeling the actors with designations such as Country A, Country B, etc.
95 U.S. AGRIC. EXPORT DEV'T COUNCIL, PROMOTING U.S. AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS
ABROAD: A PARTNERSHIP 28 (undated).
96 Id.
97 A set of rules was promulgated for the TEA program and a similar set was promul-
gated for the Cooperator program. The TEA program rules were codified in pt. 1485 and
the Cooperator program rules were codified in pt. 1550. 54 Fed. Reg. 37, 781-84 (1989)
(to be codified at 7 C.F.R. §§ 1485, 1550).
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ticipants could make sales contacts, either as members of sales teams
on CCC sponsored or approved trade missions or as participants in
U.S. brand-identified export promotions. Those sales contacts had
to be reported to the FAS which would attempt to see that "the ben-
efits generated by agreements . . . [were] as broadly distributed
throughout the relevant agricultural sector as feasible and, particu-
larly, that no program participant [derived] an unfair advantage or
benefit from activities conducted pursuant to the agreement." '9
This requirement hypothetically gave all participants from the same
industry a shot at making the potential sale generated through the
sales contacts made by members of the trade mission or brand-iden-
tified export promotion, but it still allowed for the fact that sales con-
tacts would inevitably be made during the promotional activities. 99
3. TEA Program Structure
The TEA program had two parts. The first part contemplated
the promotion of generic or branded products through nonprofit
commodity-specific trade organizations or regional state organiza-
tions. The difference in participation in the TEA program through a
nonprofit, commodity-specific trade organization, or a regional or
state-related organization can be significant.
Some representative nonprofit, commodity-specific trade orga-
nizations such as the Alaska Seafood Marketing Institute, the Califor-
nia Cling Peach Advisory Board, the National Potato Promotion
Board, and the U.S. Meat Export Federation, participated in the TEA
program in each of the five years of its existence.100 These organiza-
tions display the diversity of interests represented under this part of
the TEA program.
Some agricultural exporters have products that are not effec-
tively represented by any existing commodity-specific nonprofit
trade organization. This may be because no such trade association
exists for their products, or it may be because their representative
trade organization chooses not to participate in the TEA program.
For these exporters or prospective exporters, TEA program partici-
pation was still feasible through one of the four regional trade orga-
nizations sponsored by the state departments of agriculture: the
Eastern United States Agricultural and Food Export Council, Inc.
(EUSAFEC), the Mid-America International Agricultural Trade
Council (MIATCO), the Southern United States Trade Association
98 7 C.F.R. § 1485.5 (1992).
99 See Discussion of Comments, 54 Fed. Reg. 37, 781-82 (1989) (to be codified at 7
C.F.R. §§ 1485, 1550).
100 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AGRICULTURAL TRADE: IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN
MANAGEMENT OF TARGETED EXPORT ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, REPORT TO THE HONORABLE
CHARLES E. SCHUMER, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 42, 43 (1990) [hereinafter GAO RE-
PORT 19901.
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(SUSTA), and the Western United States Agricultural Trade Associ-
ation (WUSATA). These organizations work to increase export mar-
kets for the agricultural commodities and products that are produced
within their respective regions.
Another standard arrangement was for nonprofit, commodity-
specific trade organizations or regional state organizations, as de-
scribed above, to administer the Branded TEA Promotion programs.
The organization entered into an agreement with the CCC to admin-
ister the program. A business wishing to export a specific branded
product could enter into an agreement for reimbursement with the
trade organization administering the program. Nonprofit trade or-
ganizations administered the program under the same rules as the
FAS used to administer TEA/Export Incentive Program
(TEA/EIP).t 0 Approximately one-third of the TEA funds expended
in 1990 were expended on branded product promotion activities. 10 2
The second part consisted of the promotion of branded prod-
ucts through an Export Incentive Program but is distinguished from
the program administered under the Cooperator program by the
designation TEA/Export Incentive Program (TEA/EIP), 10 3 now
EIP/MPP. A business marketing a specific branded product may
enter into an agreement directly with the CCC to be reimbursed for
"a prearranged percentage of direct promotional expenses incurred
in foreign markets to increase sales of private brands of a specific
U.S. agricultural commodity or product."' 1 4 The CCC has entered
into direct contracts with only a few participants who are unable to
work through nonprofit commodity-specific organizations or re-
gional state organizations.
Not every applicant for TEA program funds was successful. The
law authorizing the TEA program in the 1985 Farm Bill included a
requirement giving priority to
(1) agricultural commodities and the products thereof with respect
to which there has been a favorable decision under section 2411 of
Title 19; or(2) agricultural commodities and the products thereof for which ex-
ports have been adversely affected, as defined by the Secretary, by
retaliatory actions related to a favorable decision under section 2411
of Title 19.105
Beginning in 1987, and thereafter on an annual basis, the FAS issued
a listing in the Federal Register of the commodities which qualified
101 TEAG 1988, supra note 85, at 103.
102 TEAG 1988, supra note 85, at 29.
103 TEAG 1988, supra note 85.
104 TEAG 1988, supra note 85.
105 7 U.S.C. § 1736s(c) (1988). The decision under Section 2411 of Title 19 referred
to in this legislation is the determination by the President that action is necessary to en-
force U.S. trade agreements or to respond to actions by foreign competitors that are in-
consistent with existing trade obligations with the United States or are otherwise
discriminatory and burdensome to U.S. commerce.
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for priority assistance under section 2411 of Title 19.106 Once the
applicants qualifying for assistance under a priority were given "ade-
quate" assistance, the FAS could "enter into agreements to provide
export assistance for other commodities or products thereof," with
any funding left to service those remaining applicants. 10 7
The process of receiving funding for TEA program activities fol-
lowed a fairly simple, but time-consuming path. The potential par-
ticipants had to submit an application to the FAS. The FAS would
process the application, and either deny, approve in part, or approve
the application. Once the application was approved, a participant
would then be required to submit an activity plan. The activity plan
requires a much more detailed description of the proposed activities
than that in the application.' 08
B. FAS Administration of the TEA Program
In 1986, the FAS promulgated the original set of guidelines for
the TEA program, entitled the Targeted Export Assistance Guide-
lines (TEAG), which were based in large measure on 11 FASG, the
guidelines for the Cooperator program. The TEAG were not pub-
lished in the Federal Register or Code of Federal Regulations. After
two years of experience, the FAS issued a revision (TEAG 1988).109
Under the TEAG 1988, participants in the TEA/EIP branded pro-
motion program could enter into an agreement with the CCC for up
to three years. That version is still effective for participants who have
ongoing funding under applications and activity plans which were
approved prior to the implementation of the MPP, which is operat-
ing under Uniform Market Promotion Program (MPP) Provisional
Rules beginning on March 6, 1991 (Interim Contract Provisions). I0
The CCC promulgated proposed rules for the TEA in April of 1990,
prior to its repeal in the 1990 Farm Bill."'I Due to the creation of
the MPP in the 1990 Farm Bill, the final rules for TEAG 1990 were
never issued and the proposed rules were never implemented. The
FAS administered the TEA program under TEAG 1988 until the
TEA contracts were completed, and the MPP under the Interim Con-
tract Provisions, and the Interim Rules which were published August
16, 1991.112 Eventually, the approvals authorized under the earlier
regulations will expire and the FAS will be left with a single set of
106 See, e.g., 52 Fed. Reg. 20,764 (1987).
107 52 Fed. Reg. 10,915 (1987).
108 TEAG 1988, supra note 85.
109 TEAG 1988, supra note 85.
110 Telephone interview with David McGuire, Director of Program Operations Staff,
FAS (July 1991).
1'1 Targeted Export Assistance Guidelines, 55 Fed. Reg. 17,618 (proposed rules,
1990) [hereinafter TEAG 1990].
112 56 Fed. Reg. 40,745 (1991).
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operative regulations. Eventually, it must be assumed, the Interim
Rules will be finalized.
1. Problems of the TEA Program
a. General Accounting Office Audits and Reviews
One criticism leveled at the FAS was that the solicitation of ap-
plications of potential participants in the TEA program was limited
because the FAS did not announce and describe the TEA program in
the Federal Register for the 1986 program year and that the FAS did
not solicit applications in the Federal Register for the 1986 and 1987
program years." 3 Rather, a publicity campaign was mounted in
trade publications, among trade associations, and through press re-
leases. According to the GAO, this left a large number of smaller
potential applicants in a disadvantaged position and ultimately cre-
ated a preference for entities already involved with the Cooperator
program. "14
This preference was deemed to be a result of the superior com-
munication already established between the FAS and the participants
in the Cooperator program. The GAO testimony and report did not
make any allowance for the fact that many entities most likely to be
interested in the TEA program could very well have been those al-
ready participating in the Cooperator program. The advantage to
the participants in the Cooperator program, if any, surely came more
from their familiarity with 11 FASG, the guidelines governing the
implementation of the Cooperator program, due to the similarity be-
tween 11 FASG and TEAG.
The GAO proceeded to level criticism at the FAS's handling of
the TEA program in several other areas. In statements contained in
the previously mentioned GAO Testimony, July 1988, and the GAO
Report 1988, the GAO complained that the funding allocation pro-
cess was not clearly documented and that there was little, if any, doc-
umentation demonstrating the bases on which funding allocation
decisions were made. This supposedly left the allocation system vul-
nerable to charges of unfairness and baseless distinctions between
applicants. Although the Federal Register in June of 1987 carried a
list of ten formal criteria for funding decisions, the GAO expressed a
strong desire to see documentation that established how those crite-
ria were applied in each individual case. The FAS claimed to have
inadequate manpower to maintain the extensive records for the deci-
sion making process as advocated by the GAO.' 15
The GAO Report 1988 and the GAO Testimony July 1988 also
contained significant expressions of dissatisfaction with the decision
113 Review of GAO's Report 1988, supra note 83, at 6, 7.
114 GAO REPORT 1988, supra note 91, at 19, 20.
115 GAO REPORT 1990, supra note 100.
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of the FAS to allocate funds based on TEA applications rather than
to require the potential participants to submit detailed activity plans
for evaluation prior to the allocation of funds. The FAS rationale
was that the time and expense burden would be too great for appli-
cants to create full-fledged activity plans prior to the allocation of
funds. If applicants were required to prepare activity plans and were
then denied an allocation of funds, the FAS maintained that the ap-
plicants would be carrying too large a burden. The GAO countered
that it would be necessary to require the activity plans before decid-
ing on the allocation of funds in order to optimize the use of govern-
ment funds. The FAS indicated that the fact that the funds were not
actually dispersed until an activity plan was in place provided the
government with a safeguard against the misuse of funds, even if it
did not guarantee absolute optimal use.' 16
b. Office of the Inspector General Audits
According to the GAO reports cited above and the Audit Re-
ports of the Office of the Inspector General of the USDA, submitted
to the Administrator of the FAS on March 25, 1988 and September
28, 1990, there have also been significant problems in the way the
TEA program participants have participated and maintained records
of their participation. 1 7 The primary concerns articulated revolve
around the accuracy and reliability of the reports made by the par-
ticipants in accounting for the activities conducted with the program
funds." 18 The foregoing issues were by no means the only areas of
concern expressed by the GAO and OIG, but are a good sampling.
c. Additional Observations
From the participants' viewpoint, timing may also be an impor-
tant problem with the administration of the TEA program. For ex-
ample, activity plans were required to be submitted in April of 1990
for companies participating through the Western United States Agri-
cultural Trade Association (WUSATA), one of the regional trade as-
sociations participating in the TEA program. Approval of the activity
116 GAO REPORT 1988, supra note 91.
117 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., AUDIT OF THE FOREIGN AGRICUL-
TURAL SERVICE TARGETED EXPORT ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FISCAL YEAR 1986: AUDIT REPORT
No. 07099-14-HY (1988) [hereinafter OIG AUDIT 1988]; OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S.
DEP'T OF AGRIC., AUDIT REPORT: FOREIGN AGRICULTURAL SERVICE TARGETED EXPORT
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM PARTICIPANT CONTRIBUTIONS, AUDIT REPORT No. 07020-02-HY
(1990) [hereinafter OIG AUDIT 1990].
118 The Office of Inspector General found two particularly distressing facts. First, the
end of year reports required of TEA program participants were not submitted in a timely
fashion, were inconsistent and contained significant errors, to the extent that the reports
were not useful for monitoring participant contributions. This seems to be evidence that
the participants did not take the end of year reporting requirements seriously. Second, the
FAS end of year reports were so inaccurate that they were not useful for monitoring or
administrative purposes. OIG AUDIT 1990, supra note 117, at 8, 9.
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plans was received from the FAS by the administrator of WUSATA
in late May, 1991.119 Since no expenditures are reimbursable if ex-
pended prior to the approval of the activity plans, a serious lag time
existed. Depending on the type of market promotion activity con-
templated, many windows of opportunity can be missed by the par-
ticipants during the one-year wait. Delays of this magnitude cannot
be conducive to effective planning and utilization of the TEA pro-
gram by many potential participants.12 0
C. Introduction to the MPP
In spite of, or perhaps because of, the many criticisms of the
TEA program, the TEA program was not renewed but was replaced
with the Market Promotion Program in the 1990 Farm Bill. In the
process of fashioning the MPP, some of the more distinctive features
of the TEA program were eliminated. Primarily, the requirement
that the program assistance be provided only to offset or counter an
unfair trade practice was eliminated. Under the MPP the FAS must
now give "preference" to commodities which have been adversely
affected by unfair trade practices. This loosening up of one of the
basic tenets of the program may be desirable, but with the funding
remaining level at $200 million under the MPP, it is currently mean-
ingless. The MPP legislation states that "[t]he Secretary shall pro-
vide export assistance under this section on a priority basis in the
case of an unfair trade practice."' 21 Applications for priority fund-
ing requested was in excess of $600 million for Fiscal Year 1991.122
Once the allocation is made to qualifying applicants, the FAS has no
119 Telephone interview with James Bradley, Director of Marketing, Utah Dep't of
Agric. (Mar. 1991).
120 The regional state government sponsored trade associations, such as WUSATA,
followed an entirely different approach to the application process for participation in the
TEA program than the nonprofit commodity specific trade organizations. This certainly
contributed significantly to the excessive delays experienced by some of the participants in
the programs administered by the regional trade associations. The approach followed was
for the associations to publicize to potential agricultural exporters in the region that the
TEA program existed and to encourage the potential exporters to submit applications to
participate in the program. Once the regional trade association had gathered the applica-
tions, it would submit its formal application to the FAS based on the volume of applica-
tions it received. From the time the formal application was submitted to the FAS by the
association, the approvals would be received by the participants within about five months.
However, since this process was transparent to the participants, the waiting period seemed
much longer because of the time lag between their application to the association and the
association's application to the FAS. On the other hand, the commodity specific trade
organizations approach was to submit applications to the FAS and once the approvals were
issued by the FAS the organization would announce the TEA program for the year to its
members. The members of the association could then apply to participate. This way the
apparent time lag for participants was reduced considerably. Telephone interview with
David McGuire, Director of Program Operations Staff, FAS (July 1991).
121 7 U.S.C.A. § 5623(c)(2) (West Supp. 1991).
122 Telephone interview with David McGuire, Director of Program Operations Staff,
FAS (June 1991).
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funds left to allocate to commodities which do not qualify for the
priority assistance.
The FAS has promulgated a new set of rules to regulate the MPP
(Interim Contract Provisions) modeled on the rules found in TEAG
1988, but with some concessions made to the GAO criticisms.' 23
Although the FAS has stoutly resisted some changes which it has
considered to be unfair or unduly burdensome to participants, the
trend of the legislation and the regulation is still towards increased
record-keeping and administrative controls as advocated by the
GAO. Many of the additional details specified in the MPP legislation
seem to respond directly to the GAO criticisms.
The FAS strongly resisted the GAO's notion that participants
should be required to submit complete activity plans before funding
allocation decisions are made. The burden of creating an activity
plan is substantial, since the level of detail required by an activity
plan is so great. 124 The legislation creating the MPP addresses this
issue, calling for the allocation of funds to be made after the submis-
sion of marketing plans but omits any mention of applications or ac-
tivity plans.' 2 5 This suggests quite convincingly a requirement to
submit a document more thorough and detailed than the application,
but still leaves some room for the FAS to recognize the needs of the
applicants and require something less detailed than an activity plan.
A requirement for TEA/EIP participants was that they match the
TEA funds on as much as a dollar for dollar basis, with funds which
the participant would not have spent on the funded activity in the
absence of the TEA program. 126 Other participants were en-
couraged, but not required, to contribute dollars on the funded ac-
tivity which they would not have spent in the absence of the TEA
program.' 2 7 The GAO was dissatisfied, in both the 1988 and 1990
reports, with the FAS process for determining which participants
should contribute and at what level. Congress has responded by re-
quiring contributions from participants.' 28 The FAS felt it was im-
portant to recognize varying abilities to contribute since the
participants represented interests injured by unfair trade practices.
The GAO found this variability in required levels of contribution to
be too flexible.' 29 The MPP legislation requires the participants to
contribute at least "50 percent of the cost of implementing the mar-
keting plan," except in cases where "there has been a favorable deci-
123 FOREIGN AGRIC. SERVICE, UNIFORM MARKET PROMOTION PROGRAM (MPP) AGREE-
MENT PROVISIONS (undated) (effective Mar. 6, 1991) [hereinafter INTERIM CONTRACT
PROVISIONS].
124 TEAG 1988, supra note 85.
125 7 U.S.C.A. § 5623(e) (West Supp. 1991).
126 TEAG 1988, supra note 85, at 106.
127 GAO REPORT 1990, supra note 100, at 13.
128 7 U.S.C.A. § 56 2 3(g)(2) (West Supp. 1993).
129 GAO REPORT 1990, supra note 100, at 16, 17.
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sion by the United States Trade Representative (USTR) under
section 2411 of Title 19."130 The "favorable decision" referred to
may be under the mandatory or discretionary powers of the United
States Trade Representative in making a determination that the
United States is being denied rights under any trade agreements or is
being subjected to some burden by an unfair or unreasonable trade
practice.' 3 ' In the cases where there has been a favorable decision
by the USTR, the FAS is required to apply consistent and docu-
mented criteria when waiving the 50 percent minimum contribution
requirement. 3 2
1. Creation of the MPP
The TEA program was authorized in the 1985 Farm Bill to help
U.S. agricultural exporters counter or offset unfair trade practices
that had an adverse impact on their ability to export. The FAS
designed a market development program to achieve that objective.
The implementation of the program by the FAS was not perfect and
the GAO was given some significant opportunities to criticize the
FAS. The recommendations made by the GAO would create signifi-
cantly increased administrative burdens on the FAS, and increased
documentation and compliance burdens on the participants.
Although the FAS has tried to retain as much flexibility as possible in
administering a program of such diverse application, the trend, both
in the FAS regulations and practices, and the Congressional mandate
in the MPP has been to move to a more structured, controlled, and
burdensome administrative process. As a matter of logic, the more
rigidly structured a program is, the less flexible it tends to be. Partici-
pants in the MPP are not likely to see many meaningful changes from
the TEA program, but MPP participation will be more structured
and require more effort to meet the administrative requirements. In
effect, Congress has taken the TEA program created by the FAS
under Congressional mandate and codified it with some
modifications.
An understanding of the context of the changes made by Con-
gress in the 1990 Farm Bill is vitally important to an understanding
of the possible future direction of the MPP. Just as the Cooperator
program provided a foundation and framework for the structuring of
the TEA program when it was introduced in response to declining
agricultural export markets and increasing unfair foreign agricultural
trade competition, the TEA program provided a foundation and
framework for the MPP in the face of a very uncertain future for in-
ternational trade as a whole, agricultural trade included. With the
13o 7 U.S.C.A. § 5623 (g)( 2 ) (West Supp. 1991).
131 Id.
132 Id.
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uncertainty of the international framework for agricultural trade, the
future of the MPP is fraught with uncertainty. The final portion of
this Article will briefly review the current struggle over the future of
the international framework for the conduct and regulation of inter-
national trade, especially as it relates to agriculture and more pre-
cisely the MPP.
VI. U.S. Agricultural Trade Policies
Regulation of international trade is an extraordinarily complex
affair, involving a wide variety of organizations and institutions.l3 3 It
is something that no single nation or government can control or
manage without the consent and cooperation of its trading partners
and even its competitors. Efforts have been made to create a struc-
ture for the regulation of international trade, the most significant of
which is the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The
GAIT was an indirect product of the Bretton-Woods conference of
1944 which established the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (IBRD), better known as the World Bank, and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF).13 4 The Bretton-Woods confer-
ence also contemplated but did not directly approach the creation of
an International Trade Organization (ITO), which was intended to
become the governing body overseeing and regulating international
trade. 135
A. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
1. Origins
In 1946, the United States proposed a draft charter for the ITO
and was instrumental in arranging a series of international confer-
ences held from 1946 to 1948 in which the ITO charter was to be
developed and finalized.' 3 6 The work which was conducted at the
conferences was directed not only to the drafting of the ITO charter,
but also to the creation of a subsidiary agreement on multilateral
tariff reductions and the general obligations (general clauses) relat-
133 JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 11 (1969) [hereinafter
LAW OF GAIT].
134 JOHN H.JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 27, 28 (1989) [hereinafter WORLD
TRADING SYSTEM].
135 Id. at 31, 32.
136 The primary role of the United States in creating and promoting the GATT and
other trade liberalizing policies was well demonstrated by the following quote from the
U.S. delegate to the 1946 London conference, which was one of the series of international
trade conferences from 1946-1948.
The proposed charter would no doubt require changes in the United
States Statutory Law. It was not the intention of the drafters of the suggested
charter to impose upon other countries a finalized document drawn to
United States requirements, although it was of course true that the charter
has been prepared on the basis of the United States experience.
LAw OF GATT, supra note 133, at 32 n.1.
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ing to the tariff obligations. 3 7 By the final meeting in 1948 in Ha-
vana, it was apparent that the U.S. Congress was not going to agree
to the ITO. The GATT had already been provisionally adopted. 3 8
Through remarkable ingenuity, the GATT is still around, although
the ITO concept has long since faded from the scene. The GATT
has been influential in the development and implementation of U.S.
trade policy, but there have been particularly important exceptions
to the GATT obligations for agricultural trade.
A common thread running through the agricultural trade legis-
lation of the 1980s and continuing into the 1990s is the theme that
the United States must make efforts to enhance its agricultural ex-
ports in the face of subsidies, import restrictions, and other unfair
trade practices on the part of competing nations. What is often over-
looked is the position of the United States leading up to the present
conditions and how the U.S. position may have invited unfair trade
practices of the nations competing with the United States in the agri-
cultural export markets. I3 9
2. Agricultural Waiver Under the GA TT
In the late 1940s and the early 1950s, the U.S. Congress was
unwilling to honor U.S. obligations under the GATT regarding agri-
cultural trade. 140 It passed legislation that contained protectionist
clauses, namely quotas .on specified agricultural products, and au-
thority for the President to impose quotas and tariffs on agricultural
imports when those imports negatively affected certain domestic ag-
ricultural programs.' 4' As a result, the United States, the primary
137 WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 134, at 32.
138 For an excellent discussion of the technical aspects of the adoption and implemen-
tation of the GATI', see WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 134, at 27-57.
139 The natural instability of agricultural markets due to inelastic demand and fluctuat-
ing supplies dictated by the vagaries of nature on which agricultural production depends
so completely, promotes significant swings in the price of agricultural commodities on
world markets. Production regulation in the United States and abroad helps to overcome
some of the large price swings based on big supply changes. Market regulation is also
common in many countries, through domestic regulation, subsidies, price maintenance,
and import restrictions. The import regulation, combined with the other domestic pro-
duction and subsidy programs might be effective at promoting domestic market stability,
but they may be reducing the foreign market to a residual market. These actions result in
the insulation of the domestic market from the world market, which, when enough coun-
ries take these insulating actions, renders the world market a residual market and causes
much greater fluctuations of the world market prices for commodities effected. LAW OF
GAT, supra note 133, at 719.
140 LAW OF GATT, supra note 133, at 718 (1969). For a discussion of the E.E.C.'s
attempts to support prices in a deficit area, see Kenneth W. Dunn, The European Common
Marhet in Agriculture, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 209, 217 (1967).
141 United States Defense Production Act of 1950 as amended in 1951, and the Agri-
cultural Adjustment Act of 1938 as amended in 1951. The 1948 amendments to the Agri-
cultural Adjustment Act of 1938 contained specific provisions prohibiting the enforcement
of any quota proclamation under this act that would be in contravention of the U.S. duties
under an international agreement. Agricultural Adjustment Act, 62 Stat. 1250 (1948).
However, the Congress further amended this Act in 1951 and did an about face on this
[VOL. 18
MARKET PROMOTION PROGRAM
sponsor of the GATT, found itself in direct contravention of two of
the most fundamental provisions of the GATT-Article II mandating
tariff concessions and Article XI prohibiting quantitative import re-
strictions on agricultural products.1 42 Consequently, U.S. negotia-
tors at the GATT extracted in 1955 a waiver for the United States
obligations under Articles II and IX insofar as was "necessary to pre-
vent a conflict" with Section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment
Act, 143 which was the particularly problematic U.S. legislation stand-
ing in direct conflict with the GATT obligations. 44 This waiver,
which gives the United States extensive flexibility, has been the
source of a great deal of backlash from other nations who have not
received the same waiver. The response of those nations is typically
that if the United States does not have to abide by the terms of the
GATT, then they cannot be expected to do so.' 4 5 The U.S. protec-
tionist import policies did not increase its bargaining power in nego-
tiating for more liberal agricultural trade policies from trade
partners engaged in protectionist and other unfair trade practices.146
The U.S. response has, thus, included government export pro-
motion efforts. As used in this Article, government export promo-
tion is defined as "all public policy measures that actually or
potentially enhance exporting activity either from a firm, industry or
national perspective."'147 If the definition of subsidy proposed by
the U.S. Export Competitiveness Project is accepted, then govern-
ment-sponsored agriculture programs that have been traditionally
viewed as domestic agricultural programs are clearly subject to the
scope of the GATT. This view is reinforced by some of the provi-
sions of the GATT Articles.' 48 However, in this Article the discus-
particular policy. In fact, the 1951 revisions dictated that no trade agreement could over-
ride the operation of U.S. agricultural programs. Agricultural Adjustment Act, 65 Stat.
141 (1951).
142 LAw OF GATI, supra note 133, at 734-35.
143 Section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act is still in force today, even though it
has undergone a series of amendments since it was originally passed in 1935. For a thor-
ough and detailed analysis of Section 22, see RexJ. Zedalis, Agricultural Trade and Section 22,
31 DRAKE L. REV. 587 (1981-82).
144 LAw OF GATT, supra note 133, at 735 (quoting Decision of the Contracting Parties of
GATT of March 5, 1955, GATT, 3d Supp. BISD 32 (1955)).
145 LAw OF GATT, supra note 133, at 718.
146 LAw OF GATT, supra note 133, at 734-35.
147 F.H. Rolf Serighaus, The Impact of Government Export Marketing Assistance, 3 INT'L.
MARKETING REV. 55 (1986).
148 A good discussion of the types of activities which are addressed in the original
Articles of the GATT can be found in Philip Raworth, Chapter Four: Legal Barriers to
Government Export Promotion, in F.H. ROLF SERINGHAUS & P.J. RoSSON, GOVERNMENT
EXPORT PROMOTION: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 113-50 (1990) [hereinafter Raworth]. Some
of the areas discussed are taxation (Article 111), import quotas (Article Xl), and assistance
for economic development (Article XVIII). (This list is representative, not comprehen-
sive.) The principal regulation of export promotion programs is found in Article XVI
containing the rules on subsidies. Id. at 118-27. Additionally, under the Subsidies Code,
finalized in 1979 as a part of the Tokyo Round, much more specific rules and regulations
concerning subsidies were p.romulgated. Subsidies and Countervailing Duties, Agreement on In-
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sion is limited to the programs that are specifically designed as
export promotion programs, and focus on the TEA and MPP pro-
grams in particular.
Under the GATT, there are certain restrictions on the export
promotion activities of the various governments that are signatories
(the Contracting Parties or CPs). Under the GATT, an export pro-
motion activity is only regulated if it constitutes a subsidy and conse-
quently distorts normal trading patterns, thus causing some
prejudice to the interests of other Contracting Parties.1 49 This is
reminiscent of U.S. tort law which requires an injury as a result of a
wrongful act in order for the objectionable behavior to be
actionable.
GATT barriers to government export promotion operate, therefore,
only against those measures that confer a measurable economic ad-
vantage on domestic exporters that distorts trading patterns by in-
creasing exports to a higher level than would otherwise be the case.
The question is which government export promotion measures fall
into this category.15 0
As early as 1978, when U.S. agricultural exports were near a
zenith, it was recognized that U.S. competitiveness in export markets
was less than optimal due to "the fact that U.S. government taxation,
export credits, and other policies and programs relating to exports
are less favorable than those found in competing countries." 15'
Granted, the above quote is related to exports of manufactured
goods. However, the U.S. government policies and programs have
not been so much more advantageous and favorable to agricultural
exporters as to negate the basic assertion. In addition, the agricul-
tural export promotion programs of competing countries have in-
creased dramatically since the quoted statement was made. As some
commentators noted: "The 1980s appear to be witnessing a more-
sophisticated version of the beggar-thy-neighbor depreciation strat-
egy of the 1930s .... Subsidies to exports will permit exportables to
be sold abroad more cheaply; taxes, quotas, administrative delays,
and red tape can limit imports and make them more expensive."' 5 2
The GATT, through seven rounds of negotiation, each one
named as a specific round (i.e., the Kennedy Round and the Tokyo
Round), has succeeded in reducing tariffs and has attempted to regu-
late and reduce non-tariff barriers. However, agriculture has been a
terpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIH of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, April 1979, 26 BISD 56 (1978-79).
149 Raworth, supra note 148, at 114-15.
150 Raworth, supra note 148, at 115 (citations omitted).
151 Raymond F. Mikesell and Mark G. Farah, U.S. Export Competitiveness in Manufactures
in Third World Markets, 2 SIGNIFICANT ISSUES SERIES (Georgetown Univ. Center for Strate-
gic and Int'l Studies, Wash., D.C.), No. 9 at 7 (1980), quoted in PENELOPE HARTLAND-
THUNBERG & MORIs H. CRAWFORD, GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR ExPORTS: A SECOND-BEST
ALTERNATIVE 16 (1982) [hereinafter Export Competitiveness].
152 Export Competitiveness, supra note 151, at 7.
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sensitive issue for many countries and so it has been the subject of
special treatment and exemptions under the GATT. 153 The eighth
and current round of GAIT negotiations, named the Uruguay
Round, has, at the insistence of the United States, focused on bring-
ing agricultural trade more fully under the rubric of the GATT.
As of this writing [Fall 1990], the U.S. government is taking the
very firm position that if the European Community does not make
significant concessions on the elimination of agricultural subsidies,
the Uruguay Round talks will fail because the United States and/or
the developing countries will not find the result worthwhile. 154
The most significant aspect of agricultural trade that the United
States wants to bring under the rubric of the GATT is the subsidy
aspect. Several definitions of subsidy have been put forward.15 5 The
report by the U.S. Export Competitiveness Project at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University argues
that all programs designed to support exports are subsidies: the
only question is whether the subsidies are direct or indirect. 156 An
analysis of the quality of the MPP as a subsidy or non-subsidy pro-
gram is obviously relevant to the question of whether or not it vio-
lates any obligations under the GATT.
3. Competing Approaches to Agricultural Trade in the Uruguay
Round of the GA TT
a. The U.S. Position
It is maintained by the U.S. government that a free trade envi-
ronment will enhance opportunities for all to develop and benefit
from their comparative advantages. The United States commenced
advocating a new approach to agricultural trade in the Uruguay
Round. 157 In its proposal, the United States called for the elimina-
tion, over a ten-year period, of all subsidies that affect trade, both
domestic and export subsidies, and all barriers to market access (the
zero option).' 58 The United States has since moderated its approach
and reduced its stated goal from the zero option to one of reduced
trade and production distorting subsidies together with tariffication
153 LAw OF GATF, supra note 133.
154 Fredrick M. Abbott, GATT and the European Community: A Formula for Peaceful Coexis-
tence, 12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 3 n.7 (1990) (citing, for example, Trade Talks Stalemated After
U.S.-Europe Clash, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 1990, at D2).
155 One definition offered is "a measurable economic advantage afforded to an enter-
prise by or at the direction of a government." EDMOND McGOVERN, INTERNATIONAL TRADE
REGULATION § 11.12 (2d ed. 1986).
156 Export Competitiveness, supra note 151, at 1.
157 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AGRICULTURAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: INITIAL
PHASE OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, BRIEFING REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS 17
(1988).
158 Id.
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of import barriers. ' 59 Successful implementation of the U.S. strategy
would require the elimination of the agricultural import quota waiver
that the United States extracted from the GATT Contracting Parties,
as discussed previously. Some skepticism has been expressed about
the likelihood of the United States relinquishing the waiver. 160 The
free trade result would be the ultimate trade liberalization of the ag-
ricultural sector, giving each nation the opportunity to take advan-
tage of its comparative advantages.
This basic economic principle is challenged by some. In one ar-
ticle, the premise is sharply criticized and the United States propo-
nents of the GAIT are derisively branded "GATTists", while their
support of the concept of the GAIT is compared to a religious
zeal. 16 1 The criticisms of the GATT system are three-fold. First,
preeminence or hegemony of the U.S. in world trade is fading fast;
second, the elimination of non-tariff barriers is much more difficult
than tariff reductions due to sovereignty considerations, and third,
the trade liberalization process is inherently more advantageous to
those who hold out and maintain the least liberal policies and take
advantage of those with the most liberal policies.' 6 2
(1) The MPP Under the U.S. Proposal
Under the U.S. proposal any export subsidy would be elimi-
nated, if not immediately, then over the course of the next ten years.
Under the broad definition of subsidy offered previously in the arti-
cle from the U.S. Export Competitiveness Project, export promotion
as defined in the MPP will be a subsidy, and therefore prohibited.
Obviously, the exporters are not offered a price support or a bonus
payment, but the cost of exporting is reduced by the government
assistance in developing the markets for the products. The current
proposal provides a clear definition of programs like the MPP, and
permits them to be conducted by all parties.
b. The EC Position
The European Community's EC 1992 market unification is
widely discussed and evaluated in terms of the impact on exports to
EC countries, but the unified agricultural market has not held the
same sway in the public consciousness. The Common Agricultural
159 Conference Report, One Day Conference on World Commodity Market and the Uruguay
Round of the GATT, 15 FOOD POL'v 539 (1990).
160 Dan Paarlberg, Responding to the CAP, Alternative Strategies for the USA, 11 FOOD POL'Y
157, 161 (1986).
161 Clyde V. Prestowitz et al., The Last Gasp of GATJMsm, HARV. Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr.
1991, at 130.
162 Id. at 130-13 1; see also John M. Culbertson, The Folly of Free Trade, HARV. Bus. REV.,
Sept.-Oct. 1986, at 122; Jagdish N. Bhagwati & Douglas A. Irwin, The Return of the
Reciprocitarians - US Trade Policy Today, WORLD ECON., June-Aug. 1987, at 109, 110-11.
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Policy (CAP) established in principle in 1962, has been a market-uni-
fying force resulting in significant price increases in the agricultural
sector of the EC countries.' 63 The EC countries have granted the
central EC authority the ability to set the agricultural price supports
at consistent levels for all EC countries, but have, until EC 1992,
maintained autonomy for the remaining aspects of their econo-
mies. 164 The support prices under CAP are set at a high enough
level to encourage production, but are high enough that the result-
ing commodity surpluses cannot be sold on the world market with-
out massive subsidies. 165
The European Community opposes the free market approach
and advocates an export market sharing system permitting it to con-
tinue with the domestic agricultural subsidies it has undertaken in
recent years, but permitting it to control some of the costs of export
subsidies. 16 6
(1) The MPP Under the EC Proposal
Under the EC approach, there would be a substantial level of
subsidization expected. The MPP would not suffer any disabling
conflicts with the GATT if the EC proposal were adopted in the Uru-
guay Round. However, since the EC proposal advocates a market
sharing approach rather than a competitive marketing approach, the
need for the preference found in the MPP to assist in exporting com-
modities that suffer from unfair trade practices would be somewhat
obviated. The focus of the MPP would then be almost indistinguish-
able from the Cooperator program. The suggestions of the GAO
and others that the programs be combined might then have consid-
erably more weight. One potential problem pointed out with this
outcome is the difficulty in working effectively with the EC. 167 The
U.S. experience has not always been positive, so the MPP could be-
come more significant than ever if the cooperation between the
United States and the European Community broke down.
c. The Cairns Group of Fair Trading Nations Proposal
The Cairns Group of Fair Trading Nations (the Cairns Group) is
163 Schmitt, Agricultural Policy Decisions in the EC: Consequences of Institutional Imbalances,
I 1 FOOD POL'y 334 (1986). Quantitative support is found in Masayoshi Homma & Yujiro
Hayami, Structure of Agricultural Protection in Industrial Countries, 20J. INT'L. ECON. 115, 120
(1986).
164 Schmitt, Agricultural Policy Decisions in the EC: Consequences of Institutional Imbalances,
11 FOOD POL'Y 334, 335 (1986).
165 Stefan Tangermann, Evaluation of the Current CAP Reform Package, WORLD ECON.,
June-Aug. 1989, at 175.
166 Conference Report, One Day Conference on World Commodity Market and the Uruguay
Round of the GAFF, 15 FOOD POL'y 538 (1990).
167 Dan Paarlberg, Responding to the CAP, Alternative Strategies for the USA, 11 FOOD POL'v
157, 168-170 (1986).
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a group led by significant agricultural exporting countries, particu-
larly Australia and Canada.168 It has advanced a proposal pressing
for an intermediate position which advocates trade liberalization by
setting up the tariffication of agricultural trade barriers. 169 The tariff
schedules could then be negotiated as has been done in the seven
previous GATT Rounds.
(1) The Future of MPP Under the Cairns Group
Proposal
Only strictly-defined government support programs would be
permitted under the Cairns Group proposal. This would leave the
MPP subject to interpretation to determine whether or not it fits
within the scope of the permissible programs. Because the type of
programs permitted would be direct income support programs, the
MPP does not look eligible at first blush. If it were not eligible, the
MPP would be very difficult to rework in compliance with the permis-
sible standard. The future of the MPP under the Cairns Group pro-
posal would be questionable.
d. Third World View
Finally, although the position of the Third World countries is by
no means unanimous and cannot be articulated briefly, in relation to
the basic concepts proposed by the other major players in the GATT
negotiations, the Third World importing countries, represented by
the Group of 77, are taking a fourth position generally opposing
trade liberalization proposals since the result would likely be higher
prices for imported commodities.1 70 This could represent the lobby
for maintaining the status quo in relationship to the proposals put for-
ward by the various actors in the current round of GATT negotia-
tions. A failure of any one of the proposals to be adopted could
actually result in a success of the Third World point of view.
B. Maintenance of the Current System
With the various positions being vigorously advocated and de-
fended, the Uruguay Round has continued well beyond the planned
168 The Cairns group is composed of Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Co-
lombia, Fiji, Hungary, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, New Zealand, Thailand, and
Uruguay. Higgott & Cooper, Middle Power Leadership and Coalition Building.- Australia, the
Cairns Group, and the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, 44 INT'L ORGANIZATION 589 (1990).
169 The proposal has three basic components: First, the establishment of long term
rules and framework for agriculture second, that the total support by governments to agri-
culture be systematically reduced by reducing trade distorting activities, and, third, imme-
diate steps for the alleviation of severe distortions currently being experienced. U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AGRICULTURAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: INITIAL PHASE OF THE URU-
GUAY ROUND, BRIEFING REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS 26 (1988).
170 Conference Report, One Day Conference on World Commodity Market and the Uruguay
Round of the GATT, 15 FOOD POL'y 539 (1990).
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date for the culmination of the negotiations without any clear signs
of an agreement. If no solution is reached one of two outcomes
could be anticipated. First, the current system could be maintained.
This would give the Third World countries a better solution than
those proposed by the three major groups at the GATT negotiating
table since the market prices would remain lower than with the
proposals. 17 1.
The question of whether or not the MPP would survive under
the present conditions is quite interesting. The U.S. government po-
sition is that the MPP does not violate any obligations under the
GATT, since it is not a direct or indirect subsidy.172 The payments
received by the cooperators do not amount to price enhancements or
bonuses for commodities sold. The contribution by the CCC repre-
sents an increased opportunity to do business. Of course, this defini-
tion contradicts that quoted earlier, but could reasonably be
advanced in GAT negotiations, especially since few nations adopt
the strict interpretation of subsidies offered previously.
C. Failure of the GA TT
As one of the major proponents of the GAT, the United States
might not be the first to acknowledge the possibility of the failure of
the GATT as a whole, but two closely-related factors make it a seri-
ous concern. The functioning of the GATT System (FOGS) is one of
the main negotiating topics of the Uruguay Round and maintains
some real urgency in the minds of prominent authorities. "Whether
this or other endeavors can succeed in time to bring into effect suffi-
cient improvement in the 'trade constitution' as to avoid a worldwide
economic disaster, no one can say for certain."' 73 This is a vast topic
worthy of independent analysis and far beyond the scope of this in-
quiry. However, it is important to acknowledge the possibility.
VII. Future of the MPP
The first question to consider is whether or not the MPP as it
currently exists is consistent with or in violation of the existing U.S.
obligations under the GATT. Although Congress and the Adminis-
tration are both bound to maintain the compliance of the MPP to the
GATT obligations, not all of our trading partners are bound to
agree. The fact that Congress addressed the issue as recently as the
1990 Farm Bill and came up with the MPP at that time supports the
argument that Congress was not of the opinion that the MPP would
be in violation of existing GATT obligations.
171 Id.
172 Telephone interview with David McGuire, Director of Program Operations Staff,
FAS (July 1991).
173 WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 134, at 308.
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The MPP represents a much larger commitment to foreign mar-
ket development than does the Cooperator program, yet the Coop-
erator program, with its focus on long-term market development
would have a much greater likelihood of conforming to the U.S. obli-
gations under the GATT. One conceivable approach may be a
reconstituting of the MPP as part of the Cooperator program. The
existing Cooperator program funding could then be supplemented
by appropriations currently devoted to the MPP. The overall cost of
the two programs combined might be less than the two programs
administered separately, and the economies of consolidation could
provide a measure of savings. Since the 1990 Farm Bill replaced the
TEA program with the MPP, which is notably closer in description
and form to the Cooperator program than the TEA program ever
was, the additional changes needed would not be that drastic. Some
modifications would have to be made to each program to allow them
to mesh effectively.
The advent of a new administration in the United States also
poses interesting questions as to the possibility of a significant
change in policy toward the GATT or the MPP. As to the attitude
about the MPP, the position paper issued by the Clinton Administra-
tion recommends retaining the MPP for the next five years at the
level of funding established in 1993 of $147.7 million.' 74
The second question is whether the answer would be the same
or different under each of the competing proposals advocated during
the Uruguay Round. Under the Cairns Group proposal, the MPP
could end up in contravention of U.S. GATT obligations, which
would probably result in the elimination of the MPP. Under the EC
proposal, the MPP would not be in violation of the U.S. GATT obli-
gations, but it would be anachronistic and would, therefor, be left
unfunded or would be eliminated. If the negotiators at the Uruguay
Round fail to come to an effective agreement, or if the GATT as a
whole fails, is the MPP likely to remain in place for the long term?
Additional analysis of the various GATT proposals and their im-
pact on the MPP as well as other U.S. agricultural trade promotion
programs would be a highly interesting study. However, the future
of the GATT is not certain with the negotiations of the Uruguay
Round still underway. The MPP is fairly secure in the near term, and
subject to the vagaries of domestic as well as foreign agricultural pol-
icy in the long term. With the advent of the Clinton administration,
there is a great deal of uncertainty about the GATT as well as about
the MPP.
174 EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, A VISION OF CHANGE FOR
AMERICA 91 (Feb. 17, 1993).
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